At the time, when British ministers reviewed their policy options, no obvious solution emerged. Troop withdrawal was thought difficult to justify if Stormont was introducing liberalizing measures and, even more so, if it adopted regressive policies, as this would mean abandoning the minority. Independence, it was believed would further polarize opinion in the North, result in increased violence and represent Britain abdicating its responsibilities. Some considered that unity was possibly in the long-term interests of Britain and Ireland, but with the stipulation that this must be by consent -a prospect not enhanced by what was perceived to be the ill-informed nature of Dublin's policies. Re-partition was regarded as impracticable, given the concentration of Catholics in Belfast. It was felt that direct rule might possibly provoke a Protestant backlash; in any case, it was regarded as unpalatable at Westminster, difficult to terminate once initiated and ill advised
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5
In March 1971, British ministers were informed that, owing to the persistence and high levels of violence, Chichester-Clark's government was 'finished, [its] morale ... completely sapped' 6 ; he resigned on 20 May, on the grounds of Westminster's unwillingness to intensify the campaign against the IRA. His successor, Brian Faulkner, urged (July 1971) that internment was 'vital', the 'situation demanded it'.
7 O'Neill's advice was that it would 'solve nothing', and that the minority had become so 'alienated' that reforms were 'irrelevant'; he could see 'no solution'. 8 However, in March 1971, Special Branch had argued that internment should be introduced -not because it would be effective (it estimated only 20 per cent of the IRA, the 'small fry', would be caught), but because otherwise 'Protestants will take the law into their own hands.' Crucially, Edward Heath supported it; in July he had said that 'we [must] ... contemplate' direct rule, but as a 'last resort ... It might well be right to agree to internment' first.
9 He had been informed that Faulkner was losing the support of his party's extremists.
Following internment (9 August 1971), increased nationalist alienation was reflected in rising PIRA recruitment and an upsurge in violence; the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) refused to enter talks with British ministers. Thus, one week later, Heath expressed support for a political initiative in Northern Ireland to increase the role of the minority in government. But, after discussing this with Faulkner, he concluded that it was 'not realistic'.
10 Bloody Sunday (30 January 1972) was a defining moment, though this was not immediately apparent; when Lynch phoned Heath that evening, Sir Edward responded abrasively, claiming that the IRA was attempting to 'take over the country' and that the violence would have been 'over long ago' had Eire prevented the movement using the South as a safe haven.
11 Nonetheless, the incident helped shape subsequent British policy, and crystallize views emerging from late 1971. Though ministers voiced concern that the conflict was perhaps insoluble, and violent intercommunal confrontation unavoidable (a recurrent theme in government papers in the 1970s), they also shared the conviction that a decisive political initiative was essential. They felt that there was 'no possibility of persuading Roman Catholics to go back to the old system', and yet no hope of peace unless the IRA was deprived of their support. Moreover, it seemed evident that military activity alone could not bring peace, that action was required to retain public support for the troops in Northern Ireland and that the conflict was 'affecting ... our whole position in the world'.
12
During February-March 1972, firm proposals took shape, key elements of which broadly characterized British policy over subsequent decades. It was thought that the minority must be offered a 'guaranteed role in government' (it would be necessary therefore to depart from the Westminster system), discrimination eradicated and internment phased out. Equally, it was
